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faculties and resulted in a decline of students at Leiden. 
Finally, Leiden simply could not compete in resources with the 
scientific societies in London and Paris, nor with the vast pro- 
liferation of alternative institutional settings given over to 
natural philosophy in its many guises. By the beginning of the 
20th century, when physics (in the contemporary sense of the 
word) had clearly emerged as a scientific discipline (again the 
contemporary notion), the University of Leiden would once more 
become a focus of world attention. 
In the short space he allowed himself, Ruestow has presented 
us with a minor masterpiece. If the reader is careful to keep 
in mind what Ruestow means by “physics,” “discipline,” “experi- 
mental ,‘I and “mathematical ,” this study isa valuable contribution to the 
history of modern science. His method is worth close attentionbyall 
who would examine the social history of science. There is not, 
as one finds in so many other, inferior attempts, a “social 
context” chapter at the beginning and then, later, separate sec- 
tions on textual analysis. Arguments from texts and from a grow- 
ing secondary literature in social history are closely, indeed 
inextricably, interwoven with a deft hand. Ruestow’s style, 
itself, is exquisitely wrought. He has given us a rare book 
that is sophisticated, innovative, and a pleasure to read. 
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This is an extremely interesting, instructive and readable 
collection of essays written by one of the foremost workers in 
logic, foundations and philosophy of mathematics. It deserves 
a lengthy review article and a few M.A. dissertations rather 
than the present brief and inadequate review. First because 
books of this caliber, in the field of the philosophy of formal 
science, appear only once in a blue moon. Second because its 
author takes a strong polemical stand on certain issues, an 
extemely evasive or ambiguous one on others, and a rather naive 
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attitude on still others. 
The essays composing the book have been written, and often 
extensively rewritten, over the past three decades -- in fact 
since Wang left Tsing Hua University for Harvard in 1946. About 
three-quarters of the volume had been hitherto unpublished. The 
chapter headings should give an accurate idea of the contents: 
Introduction, Mathematical logic and philosophy of mathematics, 
Characterization of general mathematical concepts, Russell’s 
logic and some general issues, Logical truth, Metalogic, The 
concepts of set, Theory and practice in mathematics, Necessity, 
analyticity, and apriority, Mathematics and computers, Minds 
and machines, Notes on knowledge and life, Themes and approaches, 
and Exercises in criticism. 
Wang criticizes analytic and positivistic philosophies for 
being irrelevant to science and life and for seeking “misplaced 
precision”. He advocates instead what he terms “substantial 
factualism”, which stresses the “gross facts” of science and 
mathematics, and draws no clear line between these two fields. 
In fact Wang claims that mathematics is just as much a branch 
of knowledge as physics or biology, whence the philosophy of 
mathematics should give insights into epistemology. Unfortunately 
he does not deem it necessary to justify this thesis by showing, 
e.g., that the manner of investigating tensor fields over manifolds 
is no different from the way electromagnetic fields are investigated 
Having started as an enthusiast of formalization, Wang has 
come to doubt its power, particularly in view of the incomplete- 
ness theorems. Every mathematician seems to know more than what 
he can prove or even formulate in exact terms. Wang translates 
his skepticism to philosophy: he could not care less for what 
is currently called exact philosophy, Moreover he makes no 
attempt to employ formal tools to elucidate any philosophical 
notions. It would seem that his reasoning on this subject boils 
down to this: Since exact philosophy has turned to be empty 
(irrelevant to or even at times at variance with science), there 
is no point in doing philosophy. 
The book is shot through with deep thoughts that one would 
like to see worked out. On intuition in mathematics: “Even in 
studying the very formal question of the independence of axioms 
and hypotheses, the best results have been obtained by extensive 
appeal to the mathematical intuitions” (p. 27). On the limits 
of constructivism: “There can be no constructive characterization 
of all constructive methods, and whether a procedure is construct- 
i.ve is to be decided by an appeal to intuition” (p. 32). On 
mathematical existence : “The question of existence has to be 
directed to the satisfiability of a property, a relation, a 
condition, a theory: is there some object or some set of objects 
with a suitable structure that satisfies a given condition?” 
(P. 49). On Bourbaki : they are guilty of “a basic inconsistency 
insofar as lip service is paid to an axiomatic theory as the 
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foundation, while serious foundational researches are frowned 
upon” (p. 241). On the computer simulation of human thought: 
“The trouble is we do not know what we are simulating, we do not 
know enough about the object (viz. the mind) we are modelling” 
(p. 309). On Goodman’s version of nominalism: “given the actual 
knowledge we do possess now, we are, I think, justified in consid 
ering , at the present stage, the no-infinity theory as either 
basically untenable or at least as too utopian to be interesting 
and significant” (p. 423). 
Everyone should be able to learn from this book and some 
scholars ought to attempt to clarify and expand -- or else 
refute -- some of its many challenging theses. This does not 
mean that the book will actually be read by many: it is far too 
original and unfashionable for that to happen. 
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Some mild deception here--the anthologizee is not George 
Boole but his wife, Mary, a fact relegated to the subtitle. 
Mary, born in 1832 to an English country parson (the brother of 
Sir George Everest, the surveyor), was strong-minded and intel- 
ligent. She studied in university classes but, being female, 
was not allowed to take a degree. (Later, she was to write that 
“the idea of testing women’s fitness for a truly womanly life by 
competitive examination is not quite a modern one; King Lear 
tried it.“) She met Boole in Cork; they married in 1855 and pro- 
duced five remarkable daughters. Perhaps the most remarkable 
was Ethel, the youngest, a writer, translator and composer, whose 
risorgimento novel “The Gadfly” became a best-seller in the USSR 
(at least three Russian operas have been based on it), and who 
died as recently as 1960 in New York City in her ninety-sixth 
year. 
To return to Mary. She understood and enthused over her 
husband’s symbolic logic and tried to organize his creativity. 
Your average genius is not an easy person to discipline, but 
George Boole was exceptional and went along with the controls 
(nominally, anyway--there is evidence that he surreptitiously 
broke the rule about not wasting time on poetry). When he died 
in 1864, Mary had fifty years of activity ahead of her. She 
filled them. Her main interests were the reform of elementary 
school teaching (particularly of mathematics) and the promotion 
and extension of Boolean algebra. 
